INTRODUCTION
China, and its more recent, emergent economy rival, India, have become major magnets for FDI in recent years, prior to the sudden dip of the new (2008/9) global recession, which has led to sharply adjusted, global patterns of FDI flows in 2009.
China has, over the past 30 years, put in place a range of measures which may be seen as potential incentives to foreign investors, and indeed to domestic investors too, at both national level and "provincial" level. [The term is shown in parentheses since it is used to include Autonomous Regions and major Municipalities, such as Beijing, which have reporting lines similar to those for provinces.] One of the interesting things to emerge from this context is that some very different outcomes can be observed albeit the nominal incentives may be very similar. This paper looks first at patterns of FDI across a small set of key, emerging nations, including China and India (section two) and across the three declared, developmental regions of the PRC -east, central and west (section three). The focus of the paper then switches, in the fourth section, to the effectiveness of and varied impacts across regions of attempted, governmental measures. Four different policy measures are examined in turn: viz, creation of specialist zones; establishment of wider geographic, "development" regions; the effectiveness of Science and Technology Industry Parks (STIPs) as technology transfer agents; and the He Xie or harmony policy in the eleventh five year plan. In section five, we examine the kind of systemic problems commonly found in the PRC in the governance frameworks which apply to businesses, both design problems, such as weakly drafted legislation, and operationally observable issues which may have some element of cultural rootedness. Table 1 below shows the strong upward trend in global FDI over the six year period prior to 2009. Interestingly, the developing economies" FDI receipts grew less quickly than the world"s and hence by extension even less quickly than developed economy receipts.
FDI TRENDS GLOBALLY AND IN BIC
Looking at the nominated countries" data separately shows just how volatile flows can be for a country such as the UK -used here as a developed economy benchmarkwhere the financial sector accounts for a significant proportion of the flows. Inflows Arguably the more important statistic, if correct however, will be the Chinese having 67% of the per capita income of the Americans and Indians 45% of that US income.
These numbers compare very favourably with the current ordered pair of just (4.5%, 1.8%). (Table 2) and FDI per capita (Table 3 ), which will be one of the twin motors of future growth in these countries. We can also see very clearly from Table 1 ). Aggregate numbers are important because, once large enough, they allow the development of some sort of scale investments in the chosen country, or area within, but the per capita data illustrate vividly just how far even the more successful developing countries still have to go to achieve their implicit goal of parity of living standards with the "rich west".
PATTERNS OF FDI ACROSS CHINA'S REGIONS
In 2000, the PRC government confirmed its "Go West Strategy" recognizing that stability and harmony within China would be initially difficult and progressively harder to maintain if they continued to oversee an increase in national wealth which was very skewed in its distribution, see for example Goodman (2004) . There is an official allocation of provinces, autonomous regions and "province status"
(or key) municipalities to three regions (East, Central and West), relative to which "Go West" is to be understood. In terms of the affluence of the inhabitants, the regions, in order, can be thought of as rich, moderate income and poor. The classification is not entirely true to the country"s geography but rather reflects the kind of economic manipulation attempted in the Go West policy. The allocation is: elaboration of the picture in Table 4 . The East still dominates the PRC"s acquisition of FDI although the final two columns show that there has been some slight proportionate movement to the Centre and the West over the last four years data available: but one stresses "slight". In that sense, the "Go West" policy has had limited success thus far, as seen through the FDI-lens. Paradoxically, the even more pronounced skew within the West in 2008, noted above, just may be evidence of some small success in the Go West policy: the success would be the attraction of FDI to the West and the irony (hence paradox) being that it was attracted to one of the already richer bits of that poorer region.
CHINA GROWTH-LINKED POLICIES AND EVIDENTIAL VIGNETTES AT NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS
We can identify a number of policies or schemes by means of which it was hoped to boost, develop and grow the Chinese economy since 1978. The first and perhaps most obvious was the very fact of welcoming foreign investment at all post-1978 with the declaration of the Open-Door Policy. As noted before, this has helped to boost the PRC economy but the impact has been heavily skewed in terms of its geographical impact, with the knowledge, and active connivance, of the Beijing government. This in turn raises its own problems, now being addressed somewhat, see the previous section and in what follows.
The remainder of this section looks at a number of policies with both national and provincial focus, to see how the same nominal, central policies may play out with differing effects across a country as vast and diverse as China.
Creation of Specialist Zones
One particular policy to aid industrial development has been the designation of various specialised "zones", which helped to create industry (specialist) clusters (see e.g. Porter, 1998 and 2000) and conferred benefits on their tenants. Development Zones (HTIDZs); and finally, the slightly broader reality which is the Pudong New Area, or industrial East Shanghai, see e.g. Pu and Foster (1996) Typically, these zones provide certain benefits both of infrastructure and tax/customs regime inter alia. SEZs, specifically, benefited from autonomy in regard to investment policy and infrastructure development; import licence exemptions; and tax breaks, see e.g. Tseng and Zebregs (2003 And within those last two sentences lies one of China"s greatest governance issues, which in turn has two aspects. Namely, the "flexibility" legitimately built in to much regulation, with a consequent, genuine need for interpretation and the exercise of interpretation which may be less than legitimate. This is discussed further in section 5.
So far so good but are these zones successful at all and similarly so across their geographic distribution? The SEZs have, in the eyes of most, worked to some extent at least, although not uniformly so -Hainan may be thought less successful for example.
The success there has been in the SEZs has been in no small measure because of the [* It was suggested that this could in part be usefully visualised by using the nested-double diamond they proposed: the nested diamond is illustrated in
Appendix 1]
Thus we see that even within successful, or rich, parts of China, the same policies can have differential impacts.
Wider Geographic Regions beyond focussed Zones
A more recent and geographically more broad-brush, zonal-type policy is exemplified by the creation of the Pan Pearl River Delta (PPRD) Region. The early focus around Guangdong in particular was a function of the political reality of the 1970s and 1980s.
The "Taiwan Issue" was a major problem; the Hong Kong problem, as perceived by
Beijing, was in the process of solution but not fully so until 1997; and much of the world, including crucially the USA, was cautious about China and its motives. Against of Guangxi to provide a mutually self supporting area capable of new growth.
Until the advent of policies such as the creation of PPRD and the establishment of the "Go West" policy, it could be argued that there had been a tendency for industrial development to be based on a one size for all approach, to modify the well known saying. So the poorer South West part of the South, rather than the rich South East began to get more consideration. Within the far-South West, Guangxi AR is the main geographical feature. It is bigger by area than Guangdong and has 60 percent the population at just under 50m but on the economic indicators has barely one-fifth the GDP and FDI of less than 5 percent that of Guangdong. But it is not all bad news.
Guangxi is sometimes described as "Facing South East Asia with the Great South West of China Behind", because of its geographic setting, see Foster and Song (2009) . It has a border with Vietnam in its south-west quadrant and is close to Hong Kong and Macau, hanging off Guangdong, as they do. In other words it has a strategic location and one whereby this autonomous region could be made into the trading gateway for most of the West region"s industrial exports and imports.
Another benefit is that it is rich in natural resources including: water for hydro-power; oil and gas; minerals (89 varieties); one of the key forest areas in southern China; and, of course, it"s hitherto fairly unspoilt sea-side, for details see Song (2004) .
With spectacular (internal) landscapes and scenery, good climate, and low pollution,
Guangxi has begun to develop as a centre for (mainly internal) tourism and could have external potential with good planning. The autonomous region offers then a prime example of an area which could still be developed but in an eco-friendly fashion.
Forests could be managed sustainably; minerals could be extracted in as eco-friendly a fashion as may be technically feasible; and the coastal region could, with sensible planning, be developed in a non-polluting fashion (e.g. only build luxury, beachside hotels in tandem with effluent treatment plants, maintaining the clear blue waters as the advantage they are at present).
In short, PPRD is at once both an example of the differences still visible from the same policy within the southern part of the country and on the other hand an exemplar of the move to try to help the less advantaged areas, in this case by linking them with the success story which is Guangdong with its three SEZs and the two SARs.
Science and Technology Industry Parks -has Technology transferred?
Science and The short answer to our question is "only partly" and the main, missing ingredients to make the knowledge transfer work, hence delivering commercialised innovations, are entrepreneurship and management skills. As Watkins-Mathys and Foster (2006) reported: "We found that innovation capability, locational factors such as being located in a regional industry cluster (in or outside STIPS), guanxi and networking opportunities, entrepreneurial skills, including international business experience, as well as access to more financial sources and capital for developing the business are more important than the government"s preferential policies. Nevertheless, many of the government"s STIPs are located in China"s industrial agglomerations, which have been proven to increase export performance and enhance a firm"s innovation capability."
During the fieldwork for that research, the authors interviewed entrepreneurs located outside as well as inside STIPs. One interviewee who had indeed chosen not to locate in a STIP is quoted as saying: (p267): "More important than having tax incentives and reduced rents is to have a good business idea and a well worked out business plan."
Furthermore, the location he had chosen, in Beijing, did not preclude networking with
Beijing"s universities and recruiting well-qualified interns and graduates from them. The problems of places such as Shanxi can crudely be described as a highly focussed "resource rape" of extractive materials necessary to underpin the first phase of the postMao industrial resurgence. The problem was and is that there was no immediate Plan B in place when things began to tail off somewhat. Not only that, but there had been a brain drain from Shanxi, with the result that one of the key necessities for a more knowledge based, new industrial phase was lacking, viz, large quantities of trained intellectual firepower. While Shanxi produced the coal to deliver power, the Beijing government controlled its price to help make manufacturing industry profitable and able to export. Thus a paradox occurred: the country got rich but the province lagged further and further behind in real income terms. Only post 2003, with new export markets for coal products and sharply increased prices did that income even begin to catch up with the rest of the country and there was little, non-extractive, higher knowledge component development and the brain drain was in flow. Cao et al (2008) propose that application of so-called He Xie Management Theory could provide the framework for a solution in the case of Shanxi. While He Xie as a phrase may translate broadly as "harmony", they take the two characters and work with them separately to explain how the theory might help. He can be taken to mean a principle of evolution and Xie can be interpreted as "design and planning", they say.
Thus, if central and local government recognise the need for and then set up effective institutional arrangements to coordinate their planning and design (the Xie), those needs can begin to cohere and form a stable basis for change. Such structural change also requires changes in psychological and cultural thinking for both the individual and the society. They suggest that He is the necessary evolution of the mind-set (or sets!), opening the way to necessary, developmental planning. This may seem, at one level, slightly trite but, if it offers a way for bureaucrats to make changes for good, while saving "face", it cannot be other than a good thing. This is an example where the tensions between the national and provincial governments in the PRC can be illustrated by the explanatory, "seven forces", contextual model proposed by Tseng and Foster (2006) ; regional and national government comprise the sixth and seventh forces in their model.
COMMON PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSION
We began by comparing China"s FDI with that of other key developing countries and the rest of the world. It emerges that although China is a big player in aggregate terms its per capita position is much less strong. Turning to the distribution of that FDI across China the picture is very skewed between the rich East and the rest of the country. The fourth section showed how a single policy or action can have very differing outcomes in its implementation, sometimes understood and sometimes coincidental, including policies specifically aimed at generating growth, for which FDI is one key driver. Finally, we highlight some common problems which are "annoying grit in the machinery" of business life in China, especially irritating from the perspective of foreign investors perhaps. First there is the issue of "flexibility" raised earlier, in the first sub-section of the fourth main section. If regulations or laws are loosely drafted making interpretation inevitable, it can cause two problems. On the one hand, one may simply get well intentioned differences of opinion: official A thinks this rule/law means X while official B thinks it means Y. Both are trying to be honest but the lack of drafting precision means two investors face two different effective rules in two different locations.
On the other hand "flexibility" can be shorthand for corruption by officials. For example, the young (Chinese) researcher engaged in our Nanjing enquiry, asked the local tax bureau there for a definitive breakdown of the tax regime being applied in the city and its development zones: the official refused a reply. From an outsider"s perspective the only possible reason for such refusal could be that there was no consistent tariff in operation for all the wrong reasons. Another example comes from a close, Chinese friend of mine, from Hong Kong, who is a chartered accountant trained in the UK. He told me how he would compute his family firm"s PRC tax liability and then go to the tax bureau in Guangdong. The final sum payable was always a matter of negotiation, he reports, even if he showed the official whom he met the calculations he had prepared, faithfully computed in line with the tax regulations. Another word to cover this sort of difficulty is "transparency", or the lack of it.
Corruption can of course be even more direct, the pay for a permit syndrome: sadly China, like India, is not free of this disease.
Another problem in the transparency mix in China is that regulations can be subject to change without notice. For example, November 2006 saw the promulgation of guidance on so-called "Regulation 17" concerning supplier-retailer contractual links.
One of its effects was to say that what had hitherto been lawful and agreed contracts were no longer approved and that foreign investors had to renegotiate their supplier deals on a basis materially more favourable to the local suppliers. How can one sensibly plan for this sort of quixotic regulatory change?
Finally there is the whole issue of IPR. China says it is aware of the problem and is committed to dealing with it. However, the problem persists as one understands it.
What the Chinese government, along with many others, sometimes seem to miss is the point that companies are not naïve: they don"t expect to like all regulations (e.g.
would we not all like income tax to be 1 percent say but we know it has to be much more!) but they do want: transparency; that policies be applied consistently over time;
and honesty. Provinces such as Shanxi might also add pan-country fairness of outcome, given their role in the Deng-era of "energy skivvies".
